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   * * * 
JAMES KEYTE:  Hi, everybody, and welcome to 
our first virtual Fireside Chat in Fordham’s first 
virtual conference.  I think most everybody knows who 
we are going to have the chat with today — Barry Hawk 
and Bill Kovacic — but, just in case, I will give a 
very quick overview. 
Barry Hawk founded the Fordham Competition 
Law Institute forty-seven years ago.  I think he 
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probably had a ponytail at the time. 
BARRY HAWK:  No.  The ponytail was later. 
JAMES KEYTE:  Barry has always been known as 
an incredibly creative, interesting free thinker in 
antitrust, and a great professor.   
Skadden Arps, where I ended up at one point 
actually, in 1989 hired Barry basically to start the 
Brussels office because he was better known in 
Brussels than most people in Brussels to the European 
Commissioners and the Member States.  He did a great 
job expanding that office for Skadden. 
Barry has written many articles, several 
books at this point, one of which we will talk about, 
and he is a close friend and mentor.   
Bill Kovacic — I don’t even know what to say 
— also I consider a close friend and mentor.  Bill is 
just iconic in our industry.  I have never really 
looked up what that means, but if I did, Bill would be 
all those things.   
Bill has also become iconic in other 
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countries, where they have approached Bill and asked 
him, “Please help me write or rewrite my antitrust 
laws.”  What could be more confirmatory than having 
countries do that? 
Bill has written extensively.  He was 
Chairman of the FTC.  He also speaks in full 
paragraphs that are beautiful, so you never have to do 
any editing of anything that he has said. 
With that, let’s have a chat. 
I want to start with Barry and ask you to 
tell us briefly about the book you just finished.  
What is it?  Why did you write it? 
BARRY HAWK:  Just quickly on the book, 
Antitrust and Competition Laws is a history of 
antitrust and competition laws — I use these terms 
interchangeably — over the centuries.1  I’m interested 
in history because I like stories — I read mystery 
stories, so I read history and like to write about it.  
The book has chapters  on laws around the world  
 
1 http://www.jurispub.com/Antitrust-and-Competition-Laws.html. 
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before 1880 (including Athens, Rome, India, China, the 
Islamic world and medieval/early modern Europe), the 
United States, the European Union, and then post-1990 
jurisdictions. Sothe book brings antitrust history  up 
to the present.  The book offers some thoughts on the 
present debate about antitrust  which was not my 
intention when I started.  
You asked why I wrote it and whether it’s 
relevant at all.  Well, Mark Twain said, “History does 
not repeat itself, but history rhymes a lot.”  Twain 
captured many things very well.  He certainly 
described the gist of history in one sentence.    
I found a lot of rhymes, not surprisingly, 
because history deals with human beings: history 
changes and it changes for a variety of reasons; it’s 
rarely a single reason.   
And that is true of competition law.  It has 
changed, I would argue, for three sets of reasons, and 
the importance of each set varies during time periods 
and societies: (1) changes in economic conditions; (2) 
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developments in economic theory or economic thinking 
(what had been called political economy before modern 
economics); and (3) politics or shifting political 
interests — I am using “politics” in a neutral sense.  
So economic conditions, economic theory, and politics. 
The history of cartels is one example. 
Beginning in the 19th century, the Europeans tolerated 
cartels, and that toleration ended after the Second 
World War.  That roughly one-hundred-year toleration 
was an historical aberration.  Before that, Europeans 
pretty much had legal prohibitions on cartels.  The 
reason for the century of toleration and the ending of 
the period after the war was a political decision 
rather than changes in economic conditions or economic 
theory. 
Another example of a preindustrial 
combination of conditions, theory, and politics is the 
European medieval and early modern bans on 
forestalling.  Forestalling was going to a farmer and 
buying grain from the farmer rather than letting the 
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farmer go to the local village market to sell his 
grain. 
Forestalling bans are found throughout 
Western Europe.  They end during the 19th century, 
because economic conditions changed as agricultural 
markets become less isolated. And starting with the 
French thinkers (the philosophes)and ultimately Adam 
Smith, economic theory developed to believe that  
middlemen and free trade  improved supply and demand.    
Third, it took a hundred years under English 
common law for the people who were benefiting from 
free trade to have the political power to finally 
overcome the resistance of English courts to get 
Parliament to repeal the ban to enforce the law. 
A modern example in the United States of 
politics, conditions (usually economic conditions), 
and theory started with what I call the expansionary 
period of U.S. antitrust law, which started in and 
ends sometime in the late 1970s.  When I listen to a 
lot of discussions today, it’s like nobody was born 
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before 1980; it’s like everything started in 1980.  
Well, from 1937 to the end of the 1970s was 
clearly the most expansionary period of U.S. antitrust 
law — you can’t argue about that. For example, 
vertical and horizontal mergers with market shares 
under 10% were condemned. Numerous section 2 
challenges were brought against large successful U.S. 
firms.   
Why?  The launch of the expansionary period 
owed more to  politics than changes in  economic 
conditions or developments in economic theory.  
Franklin Roosevelt in his first term wanted 
cooperation to combat the effects of the Depression.  
He reversed course  after he was reelected in 1936. 
President Roosevelt was very pragmatic — concluding 
that if cooperation is not working, then the U.S. 
should try competition.  He hired Robert Jackson, then 
Thurman Arnold — boom! All of a sudden, antitrust, 
which had been very quiet since 1921, became very 
aggressive. 
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Politics started this, but after the Second 
World War economic conditions and economic theory 
reinforced this aggressive or expansionary antitrust. 
If you forced me to pick one economic 
condition which is maybe the most important, it is the 
prevailing assumption or belief about the persistence 
of market power.  For several decades after World War 
II, if a firm like General Motors or duPont had a lot 
of market power, they faced little to no foreign or 
potential competition; therefore, it wasreasonable to 
assume that their market power would persist absent 
antitrust intervention. 
You also had economic theory — Donald 
Turner, Carl Kaysen, Joe Bain.  These were highly 
respected and influential economists who advances the 
so-called structuralist paradigm which held:  “If  
you’ve got concentration that leads to bad 
performance.”  
JAMES KEYTE:  Barry, I’m giving you thirty 
seconds to wrap this point up and then I am going to 
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turn to Bill, but it is a key transitional point. 
BARRY HAWK:  That’s fine. 
Then what I call the retrenchment era begins 
in the 1970s, which is the present era.  You’ve got a 
change in economic conditions — only a minority now  
thought  that General Motors was going to continue 
have dominance --- given the introduction of foreign 
competition.  The economic theories changed with  the 
challenge of the structuralists.  And you have one new 
thing that may be unique in history — that’s what I 
will call a worldview or weltenschauung which reflects 
an inhospitality toward the application of antitrust 
law, resting on concerns about the cost of the system 
and assumptions about economic conditions like market 
power. 
Fine.  I’ll stop. 
JAMES KEYTE:  All right.  As all of us who 
know Barry know, if I didn’t stop you, Barry, you 
would go on — and everything is quite interesting — 
and we will get back to these same points after we 
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hear a little bit from Bill. 
Bill, I have a pretty broad question for 
you.  It seems that antitrust is in kind of a new 
inflection point where people are anticipating 
something really coming from antitrust — whether it’s 
in Big Tech, mergers, the digital economy — but there 
sometimes seems to be a gap between what is aspired to 
and what can be delivered, whether it is in 
enforcement in courts or elsewhere. 
I want to know, do you think that’s right;  
have you seen it before; what has been your 
experience; and then relate it to where we are today? 
BILL KOVACIC:  First, James, thanks for the 
chance to be part of this chat, especially with Barry, 
who is one of the handful of people who created the 
community that we call the global community of 
competition policy people with Fordham as the hub, and 
it is wonderful to watch you continue that tradition 
of the school.  So thanks for the chance to be here, 
and great honor to Barry for his work. 
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I think we are in a crucial transition of 
the kind you described, and Barry captures precisely 
the conditions that tend to cause this type of 
transition:   
• Economic upheaval that causes great 
distress;  
• A change in the literature — by my count, 
there have been fifteen significant books published in 
the last two years that raise the question about 
whether our treatment of dominant firms and mergers 
has been adequate and decisively saying “No.”  So a 
powerful change in the literature; and 
• A political mood that has changed as well, 
with, as we saw earlier this week, demands in the 
House Judiciary Subcommittee report for a fundamental 
retooling of the antitrust system. 
I think what is missing in this is the 
appreciation for why we fall short in the way that you 
mentioned before. 
In the late 1970s, I joined the FTC for the 
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first time and we were coming to the end of a decade 
in which the Department of Justice and the FTC 
undertook a sweeping program of efforts to restructure 
concentrated industries — petroleum, breakfast cereal, 
computers, telecommunications, bread, chemicals — a 
host of areas. 
I think what was missing was an appreciation 
for the mismatch between commitments and capabilities.  
If you are going to take on all those battles, you 
have to have an extraordinarily capable team of 
professionals in the enforcement agencies to do that. 
I think a major gap in the House report is 
its failure to address the implementation challenges.  
There is an admonition in the report that says, “We 
need more resources.”  We don’t just need more bodies; 
we need elite people, people who are really superior 
in their ability not just to fight one big case at a 
time, but to fight several. 
When you look at our past experience, you 
can see the resources that defendants will mobilize to 
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protect existing business models and market 
structures, and at the FTC so many matters came to 
grief in the late 1970s and early 1980s because the 
FTC, and to some extent the Department of Justice, 
were simply overwhelmed by the talents that were being 
brought to bear against them. 
The suggestion that Alison Jones, my 
colleague at King’s College, and I made to the House 
Committee in our written comments was: You not only 
have to raise the budgets dramatically, but you have 
to raise the compensation levels.  Alison and I 
suggested that you at least have to put the 
competition agencies on the same footing as the 
financial services regulators — do what we did for the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), which 
basically means a 20 percent bump in the federal pay 
scale. 
Our suggestion was if you want to go to the 
moon you have to pay for it.  Our idea was in the case 
of the FTC to raise the budget from roughly $300 
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million to $1 billion a year, do it for ten years, and 
go out and hire the best.  Be willing in many 
instances to pay market rates to get the best 
litigators, the best economists, and — very important 
— the best technologists. 
Our simple point was: if you are promising 
to go to the moon but you are providing resources and 
compensation that doesn’t match, you will be lucky to 
get to Kansas City. 
JAMES KEYTE: That’s excellent, and it leads 
into a question for both of you and also some of the 
questions that I have been getting in some chat. 
There is some enthusiasm there, Bill, and 
Barry has brought the broad perspective to where we 
are now.  I want to understand whether your views of 
antitrust enforcement and principles, really the 
underlying principles — the analytical framework, the 
consumer welfare standard — have they changed over the 
years?  What was it twenty years ago, forty years ago 
— not to get into too many decades — and has it 
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evolved, and in what ways?   
I will start with you, Barry. 
BARRY HAWK: History is relevant.  When we 
start out in 1890, it’s the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 
not the Sherman Competition Act.  The popular concern 
was about the effects of large firms that often were 
organized as trusts.Over the years, the trust as a 
form of business organization disappeared.  
Importantly, the antitrust laws or the Sherman Act 
went from an antitrust act to a competition act.  
There is a lot of debate about what competition means, 
but competition was the essential element of antitrust 
law. 
Then, in the 1970s competition seems to have 
transitioned into consumer welfare.  Today we talk 
about consumer welfare.  The nature and importance of 
a distinction between consumer welfare and competition 
is not entirely clear to me. I think there are 
different notions of competition and different notions 
of consumer welfare.  You can blend them, play with 
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them — but I will just stop there. 
I don’t see the history of the United States 
so much in terms of the concept of competition or 
consumer welfare.  I am not seeing it that way. 
JAMES KEYTE:  Bill? 
BILL KOVACIC:  Yes, it has changed 
dramatically.  If you want to read two landmarks from 
the 1960s that identify the broad egalitarian vision, 
read the Brown Shoe merger decision from 1962 and read 
the Procter & Gamble merger decision from later in the 
decade.  Both of these consciously embrace a broad 
vision of what competition law should do. 
Most significantly, the last page or so of 
the Brown Shoe merger decision says:  “We willingly 
sacrifice efficiency benefits of this vertical merger 
for the sake of preserving a more egalitarian business 
environment because that is what Congress wanted in 
1960 and we are delivering on that.” 
That language disappeared from the Supreme 
Court decisions basically going from Brunswick in 1977 
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forward.  It just evaporates. 
Why does that happen?  In part because there 
is an economic upheaval going on where the United 
States is no longer preeminent, as it was in 1962, 
with Japanese and German producers suddenly becoming 
very effective competitors, and courts understanding 
this and not willing to cast efficiency aside.   
But you had the academic consensus that 
said, “This has to happen as well.”  It wasn’t Judge 
Bob Bork in The Antitrust Paradox in 1978; it was Phil 
Areeda and Don Turner in the first three volumes of 
the Antitrust Treatise published in 1978, where Areeda 
and Turner said: “These broader egalitarian goals in 
the legislative history and in earlier cases — yes, of 
course ignore them.”  And why do they say “ignore 
them?”  Because you cannot formulate what they called 
an “administrable framework” for making all of these 
goals effective in individual cases and trading them 
off as you want to. 
The modern contest brings us back to that 
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fundamental issue and says, “Yes, you can do these 
things” — and that’s in the House report.  The House 
report very specifically says, “Repudiate the consumer 
welfare vision; bring antitrust back to its original 
roots in this broader vision of what competition law 
should accomplish.” 
JAMES KEYTE:  Bill and Barry, very well 
said.  There is a challenge, of course, and then what 
you can do with that with where courts are now. 
That brings me to my last question for both 
of you: Where do you think these investigations of Big 
Tech are going to land both in terms of at the DOJ and 
the FTC and also in light of where we are in our 
jurisprudence? 
BARRY HAWK:  If there is going to be a 
transition, as you put it, or an ending of this 
present retrenchment era, you have to deal with this 
inhospitality tradition in the courts — I’m calling it 
the inhospitality tradition — or worldview, i.e. a 
weltenschauung.  It’s what Olivier Guersent two weeks 
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ago termed “legal culture,” which is pretty much  the 
same thing.  He said, “The Americans have a different 
legal culture.” 
Inhospitality toward antitrust law is well 
documented — it started with Matsushita,2 right? — and 
that has to be dealt with.  I see that as the major 
obstacle to change. 
If you want “reforms,” like the House Report, the 
biggest obstacle is the courts right now.  There are 
different ways of dealing with that problem, if that’s 
the problem. 
How can reformers respond?  It is very 
difficult to challenge a court’s worldview or legal 
culture. There are different ways of dealing with 
this. You can do it directly — you can change the 
court, change the judges.   You can enact new 
legislation as the Parliament did in 1841 when 
repealing forestalling bans. 
BILL KOVACIC:  I think by the end of this 
 
2 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986). 
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calendar year we are going to see major monopolization 
lawsuits filed by the Department of Justice against 
Google, by the Federal Trade Commission dealing with 
Facebook, and by the State Attorneys General either 
joining or bringing additional cases in both respects.  
We are going to have the next big wave of 
monopolization cases. 
They face a foreboding judicial gauntlet.  
It’s an extremely demanding set of standards — not 
impossible.  The challenge is to take the footholds 
that still exist and map out a path to the summit 
using favorable court of appeals precedents like 
Microsoft as well.   
So there is a way to get there, but there 
are a lot of dead bodies along the way on what’s 
called “the death zone on Everest.”  You will see them 
as you’re going up.  You have to be very careful to 
try to make it to the summit.  It is a hard climb and 
dangerous.   
I think there is a way there, as both 
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agencies and all of the public enforcement officials 
now are saying, “We have changed our risk appetite.  
We are willing to take that chance.” 
I think what Congress is saying is, “Even if 
you lose, it’s worth bringing the cases; and then, if 
you lose them all, that is why we are going to change 
the law.” 
  That is why they have the parallel 
suggestion in the report to change the law.  They 
named over ten cases that they want to topple by 
statute, and easily five of them go to the core of the 
modern nonintervention-minded Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, the favorites that Barry just mentioned 
— Matsushita, Brooke Group, Verizon, American Express, 
Ohio.   
The report says, “We have to clear these 
obstacles out of the way.”  It is a recognition in the 
report that these are risky and difficult cases to 
bring with additional doctrine — not impossible. 
The Court is not inflexibly averse to 
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finding antitrust liability.  In the 2010 decade, the 
FTC went three times to the Supreme Court and won 
three in a row, in cases which at the table internally 
at the FTC, the General Counsel’s Office said, “More 
likely than not you’ll lose.”  They prevailed in all 
three.  So it can be done, but it is an exceedingly 
difficult journey to make. 
What Congress is saying is, “We don’t care 
if you lose.  At least play the match.  You won’t know 
if you are going to lose until you play the match,  
that’s why you play the match; and in parallel we will 
do our best to try to change the law, to change these 
defaults. 
JAMES KEYTE:  Thank you.  Very provocative. 
Do you have one sentence you want to give 
me, Barry, and then I will say a few things and people 
can go back to their tables. 
BARRY HAWK:  Congress can do what 
legislators have done throughout history — If they do 
not like the law, they pass new legislation. 
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I think maybe, given everything that is 
happening that we’ve talked about, five years from 
now, despite this inhospitality tradition, my 
prediction is that in some of these cases brought by 
the agencies, the Supreme Court will decide in favor 
of the agencies. This is what history teaches us. 
JAMES KEYTE: My last comment is it is going 
to be a very interesting year for sure, either way — 
if it cuts through the courts or if we see generation 
of some legislation and debate about that.  Certainly 
by the time we have our live conference next year 
there will be things to talk about. 
BILL KOVACIC:  James, in the presidential 
debate the one question I would like to ask Joe Biden 
is: “Are you and your running mate in favor of the 
House report or not?  Would you take that package?” 
JAMES KEYTE:  That would be a very 
interesting question, for which we typically do not 
get straight answers from all politicians. 
BILL KOVACIC: Well, take it seriously.  It’s 
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on the table. 
JAMES KEYTE:  We will know and we will talk 
about that next year. 
I do think, with the composition of the 
Supreme Court, we even saw in Amex a pretty solid set 
of facts for harming rivals and disadvantaging rivals, 
but at the same time with a marketplace that was 
growing dramatically, and the majority there had the 
view that the consumers were not harmed in that 
circumstance. 
So it will be a very interesting potential 
large collision down the road if these cases actually 
come to fruition. 
Thank you very much for our first Fireside 
Chat.  I couldn’t have asked for two more important 
and better people for this, and we will do it again 
during the course of the year and then live again next 
September or October. 
I will turn everybody back to your tables.  
You can stay there as long as you want. 
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I will highlight that Freshfields is having 
their similar event starting soon.   
I would like to see everybody tomorrow 
morning at the event with Kirkland & Ellis.  We also 
have another set of keynotes and an in-house counsel 
roundtable Karen Lent runs, which will be wonderful 
and very relevant today. 
Thank you both again very much. 
